MITRE ATT&CK is everywhere. Every red team report mentions it. Every vendor slaps it on their marketing. Most people use about 10% of it.
This guide is for red teamers who want to use it properly — for planning, execution, and reporting — not just for optics.
What MITRE ATT&CK Actually Is
MITRE ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge) is a knowledge base of adversary behaviors based on real-world observations. It’s not theoretical. Every technique in the matrix was documented from actual threat actor activity.
It’s maintained by MITRE, a non-profit funded largely by the US government. The framework has become the closest thing the security industry has to a universal language for describing how attacks happen.
There are three main matrices:
- Enterprise — Windows, macOS, Linux, cloud, containers, network
- Mobile — Android and iOS
- ICS — Industrial control systems
For most red team engagements, you’re living in Enterprise.
The Structure: Tactics, Techniques, Sub-techniques
This is where most people get fuzzy. Here’s how the hierarchy works:
Tactics (The “Why”)
Tactics are the adversary’s objective at a given stage. The current Enterprise matrix has 14 tactics:
- Reconnaissance — Gathering info before the attack
- Resource Development — Setting up infrastructure, accounts, capabilities
- Initial Access — Getting a foothold
- Execution — Running malicious code
- Persistence — Maintaining access across reboots/disruptions
- Privilege Escalation — Getting higher permissions
- Defense Evasion — Avoiding detection
- Credential Access — Stealing credentials
- Discovery — Learning about the environment
- Lateral Movement — Moving through the network
- Collection — Gathering target data
- Command and Control — Communicating with compromised systems
- Exfiltration — Getting data out
- Impact — Destroying, encrypting, or degrading systems
Techniques (The “How”)
Techniques are specific methods used to achieve a tactic. For example, under Credential Access, you have:
- T1003 — OS Credential Dumping
- T1552 — Unsecured Credentials
- T1558 — Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets
Each technique page tells you: what it is, how adversaries use it, which threat groups have used it, what data sources detect it, and what mitigations exist.
Sub-techniques
Sub-techniques drill down further. T1003 (OS Credential Dumping) has seven sub-techniques:
- T1003.001 — LSASS Memory
- T1003.002 — Security Account Manager
- T1003.003 — NTDS
- T1003.004 — LSA Secrets
- T1003.005 — Cached Domain Credentials
- T1003.006 — DCSync
- T1003.008 — /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow
This granularity matters for red teamers. When you say “we dumped credentials,” that means nothing. When you say T1003.006 DCSync via a compromised DA account, that’s something a blue team can respond to.
How Red Teamers Use ATT&CK
There are three main use cases: planning, execution mapping, and reporting.
1. Adversary Emulation Planning
The highest-value use of ATT&CK is building campaigns that emulate specific threat actors. MITRE provides ATT&CK Groups — documented threat actors with their known TTPs.
If your client is a financial institution worried about Lazarus Group (G0032), you can look up exactly what techniques they’re known to use and design your engagement around those. This turns “generic red team” into “realistic threat simulation.”
Practical workflow:
- Identify target threat actor(s) relevant to your client’s industry
- Pull their ATT&CK Group page — note which techniques are attributed
- Prioritize techniques relevant to the client’s environment
- Build your attack chain from those techniques
- Document the mapping before you start
This is adversary emulation, not just penetration testing.
2. The ATT&CK Navigator
MITRE ATT&CK Navigator is the visualization tool you need to know. It’s a web app that lets you create layered views of the ATT&CK matrix — color-coded by technique status, actor coverage, detection coverage, whatever you need.
Red team uses:
- Scope definition — Before an engagement, build a navigator layer showing which techniques are in scope vs. out of scope. Share it with the client for alignment.
- Coverage tracking — During the engagement, mark techniques as tested (green), in progress (yellow), or not tested (red).
- Comparison — After the engagement, overlay your tested techniques against the client’s detection coverage to show gaps visually.
The Navigator is free, open-source, and runs locally if you don’t want to use the hosted version.
3. Atomic Red Team
Atomic Red Team by Red Canary maps individual attack tests to ATT&CK techniques. Each atomic test is a small, self-contained test that exercises a specific technique.
Useful for:
- Control validation — Testing whether specific detections fire
- Purple team exercises — Running known-bad techniques with the blue team watching
- Scoped engagements — When a client wants to test specific TTPs without a full red team campaign
Invoke-AtomicRedTeam is the PowerShell framework for running them on Windows. There’s also a cross-platform CLI version.
4. MITRE CALDERA
CALDERA is MITRE’s own automated adversary emulation platform. It runs ATT&CK-based operations using an agent/server architecture.
It’s useful for automated adversary simulation and purple team exercises, but it’s not a replacement for a skilled red team on a full engagement — it’s too detectable and predictable. Use it for defined scope tests and control validation.
Building a TTP Chain from ATT&CK
Here’s a practical example. Suppose you’re running an engagement against a mid-size company and you want to emulate a ransomware operator.
A realistic kill chain might look like this:
| Stage | Tactic | Technique | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Foothold | Initial Access | T1566.001 — Spearphishing Attachment | Malicious Office doc |
| Execution | Execution | T1204.002 — User Execution: Malicious File | Victim opens doc |
| Persistence | Persistence | T1547.001 — Registry Run Keys | HKCU Run key |
| Escalation | Privilege Escalation | T1055 — Process Injection | Inject into winlogon |
| Credential Theft | Credential Access | T1003.001 — LSASS Memory | Mimikatz sekurlsa::logonpasswords |
| Lateral Movement | Lateral Movement | T1021.002 — SMB/Windows Admin Shares | PsExec with stolen creds |
| Discovery | Discovery | T1018 — Remote System Discovery | net view / BloodHound |
| AD Compromise | Credential Access | T1003.006 — DCSync | Domain Admin → DCSync |
| Impact | Impact | T1486 — Data Encrypted for Impact | Simulated ransomware deployment |
This isn’t just a list of things you did — it’s a structured story of how an attacker moved through the environment. That’s what good reporting looks like.
Writing ATT&CK-Mapped Reports
This is where most red teamers drop the ball. They include a table of ATT&CK techniques at the end of their report and call it mapped. That’s not useful.
Here’s how to do it right:
Finding-Level Mapping
Every significant finding should have its ATT&CK technique ID in the finding header. Not just “we dumped credentials” — write:
T1003.001 — OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
We extracted credentials from LSASS memory using Mimikatz on HOSTNAME-01, capturing domain credentials for 3 service accounts including svc-backup (which had local admin rights on 47 workstations).
The technique ID gives the blue team a direct reference to mitigation and detection guidance. They don’t have to interpret your finding — they can go straight to the ATT&CK page.
Attack Flow Narrative
Include a narrative attack flow section that tells the story chronologically with technique IDs inline. This helps the blue team understand sequencing — which techniques enabled the next ones.
Detection Coverage Heatmap
Overlay your tested techniques with the client’s current detection coverage in a Navigator layer. Techniques where you succeeded and they had no detections = clear priority for their detection engineering team.
Recommended Mitigations
Each ATT&CK technique page lists specific mitigations. Reference them by ID in your recommendations:
M1026 — Privileged Account Management: Restrict DA account usage to DC-only operations. Remove DA from local admins on workstations.
This gives your recommendations immediate traceability to documented best practices.
ATT&CK for Specific Environments
Cloud (ATT&CK for Cloud)
The Enterprise matrix now includes sub-matrices for:
- AWS, Azure, GCP
- SaaS (Microsoft 365, Google Workspace)
- Containers (Kubernetes)
Cloud-specific techniques are increasingly important as organizations move workloads off-prem. If you’re doing cloud red team work, make sure you’re using the cloud-specific technique IDs — not just the endpoint techniques.
For example, T1078.004 (Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts) covers credential abuse in cloud environments, distinct from on-prem account attacks.
Active Directory
AD attack chains map cleanly to ATT&CK. When you’re doing a typical internal engagement:
- BloodHound findings → T1069.002 (Domain Groups) + T1482 (Domain Trust Discovery)
- Kerberoasting → T1558.003 (Kerberoasting)
- AS-REP Roasting → T1558.004 (AS-REP Roasting)
- Pass-the-Hash → T1550.002 (Pass the Hash)
- Pass-the-Ticket → T1550.003 (Pass the Ticket)
- Golden Ticket → T1558.001 (Golden Ticket)
- Silver Ticket → T1558.002 (Silver Ticket)
- DCSync → T1003.006 (DCSync)
Having these mapped in your report turns “we got DA” into a documented attack path with specific detection guidance for each step.
Common Mistakes
Mapping post-hoc for optics. If you document techniques only to fill a table in the report, it shows. The mappings are vague, the techniques are generic, the sub-techniques are missing. Plan the mapping before the engagement, not after.
Using only the most common techniques. The first-page techniques on ATT&CK are the ones defenders focus on. Real threat actors use less-documented techniques precisely because they’re less monitored. Build coverage across the matrix.
Ignoring Reconnaissance and Resource Development. Most red team reports skip tactics 1 and 2 entirely because those happen before the engagement starts. That’s a gap — adversary OSINT and infrastructure setup are observable behaviors that defenders can and should detect.
Not tracking what you tested vs. what you didn’t. A Navigator layer showing only tested techniques is incomplete. The valuable deliverable shows tested + detected, tested + not detected, and not tested. That’s the coverage picture.
Missing the “why this matters” on each technique. ATT&CK gives you the “what.” Your report needs to add the “so what” — what does successful exploitation of this technique enable an attacker to do next?
Resources Worth Bookmarking
- ATT&CK Enterprise Matrix — Start here for any research
- ATT&CK Navigator — Layer visualization tool
- Atomic Red Team — Atomic tests by technique
- CALDERA — Automated adversary emulation
- ATT&CK Groups — Documented threat actors with their TTPs
- CTI Blueprints — Report templates designed around ATT&CK
Bottom Line
MITRE ATT&CK is a tool, not a checkbox. Used well, it makes your red team engagements more realistic (by grounding them in documented adversary behavior), your reports more useful (by giving blue teams direct references to detection and mitigation guidance), and your coverage tracking more honest (by making gaps visible).
The teams doing this right are the ones who plan their TTP chains against ATT&CK before the engagement starts, track coverage in real time during execution, and deliver Navigator layers alongside their reports.
If you’re just bolting technique IDs onto findings at the end — you’re doing it for the client’s slide deck, not for their security.
Interested in building out your red team capabilities? See our guides on BloodHound for AD Attack Path Mapping , DCSync Attacks , and Active Directory Lateral Movement .
Need custom threat intelligence-driven red team planning for your organization? CipherWrite delivers technical security content built by practitioners — reports, playbooks, and adversary emulation plans.
